

Subjective Losers of Globalization

Paper prepared for the 2021 meeting of the “AK Wahlen und politische Einstellungen”

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Abstract: Researchers often ascribe the rise of right-wing populist parties to a new cleavage over issues related to globalization and a revolt of the “losers of globalization”. Surprisingly, an obvious corollary of this argument has hardly been studied: Whether individuals see themselves as “losers of globalization”, and to what consequence. Building on previous research on the globalization divide, we argue that these self-perceptions might be politically relevant: Elites may appeal to voters’ perceptions of belonging to those left behind by globalization, and voters may form attitudes on globalization-related issues and party preferences in part based on their self-images as losers (or winners) of globalization.

Drawing on survey data from 2018 Germany, we find a sizable group of citizens to self-categorize as losers of globalization. These subjective losers of globalization disproportionately support the radical-right AfD and hold distinctive positions on globalization-related issues such as trade, immigration, and European integration. Investigating socio-structural divisions emphasized in previous research on the globalization divide, we find socio-economic deprivation at the regional level to affect individual’s self-perceptions and a big educational gap, especially in more recent cohorts.

We conclude that there is evidence of a division between “globalization losers” and “winners” at the level of subjective group membership that is rooted in social structure and politically consequential. This subjective division may lend structure and stability to an emerging cleavage over globalization. Our study joins recent calls to pay more attention to how subjective group membership and attachment shape emerging cleavage constellations.

Keywords: AfD; cleavage; educational divide; globalization; losers of globalization, right-wing populism.

Introduction

When explaining electoral gains of right-wing populist parties across the high-income democracies, journalists, politicians, and scholars alike often point to the so-called “losers of globalization”. Indeed, in the public and academic debate that followed the June 2016 Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s election in November 2016, the “losers of globalization” have been hard to escape. For example, Pierre Moscovici (2016)—then EU Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs—stated in a speech at Harvard University shortly after the election of Trump, that “a growing part of our populations can no longer relate to the existing systems, and are seeking new ways of expression, and new representatives to deal with their concerns. These voters consider themselves the losers of globalisation.” Was Moscovici right that a lot of citizens across the high-income democracies view themselves in these terms? Who are these citizens? Do they hold distinctive issue positions? And do they overwhelmingly support parties of the radical right?

Academic research does not give clear answers to these seemingly straightforward questions. To be sure, there is by now a considerable body of literature claiming that Western European politics is characterized by a new political divide, or cleavage, revolving around issues related to globalization (Azmanova 2011; Bornschier 2010; de Vries 2018; de Wilde et al. 2019; Hooghe & Marks 2018; Jackson & Jolly 2021; Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012; Mader et al. 2020; Teney et al. 2014; Teperoglu & Tsatsanis 2011). The “losers of globalization” figure prominently in this literature. Kriesi and colleagues (2008: 4), for example, see the roots of the “integration-demarcation cleavage” in “a new structural conflict between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization”. Yet, while studies offer a variety of operationalizations of “losers of globalization”, we are unaware of any research within this literature, and beyond, in which individuals have ever been directly asked whether they view themselves as either “losers” or “winners” of “globalization”.

We argue that this is a crucial omission. First, on a most fundamental level, it is unclear whether self-perceived losers of globalization exist. There is some controversy around this question. Many scholars appear to use “losers of globalization” as a loose umbrella term to refer to a heterogeneous set of individuals—manual workers in declining industries, the low educated, individuals living in socio-economically deprived regions—without necessarily implying that these individuals would self-categorize in that way. Others articulate doubts, based on the tendency of individuals to avoid ascribing to negatively connotated social categories (Huddy 2001; Tajfel & Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981), that self-categorizations as “losers of globalization” can be salient for individuals’ self-images (Bornschieer et al. 2021). Still others, such as Kriesi and colleagues (2008: 4), built their argument on an emerging globalization cleavage explicitly on the idea that citizens are aware of their roles as either winners or losers of globalization. Because such self-perceptions have not been measured, we do not know who is right, especially whether a sizable share of citizens self-categorizes as globalization loser, or not.

Second, in line with Kriesi and colleagues (2008), self-perceptions as globalization losers (or winners)—if they exist—might be politically relevant and play a crucial role for the emerging cleavage over issues associated with globalization. We may expect such subjective group membership to reflect divisions between socio-structurally defined groups—such as those with low versus those with high formal education—that tend to be differentially affected by socio-economic transformations associated with globalization. But subjective group membership and such “objective group membership” will not coincide perfectly—and ultimately it is the self-perceptions that should matter politically. Specifically, self-perceptions as globalization losers and winners might be politically consequential in several ways. At the level of individual attitude formation, an individual’s sense of whether she/he belongs to those profiting or losing from globalization is bound to shape her/his attitudes on globalization and associated issues. At the elite level, politicians and parties may appeal to individuals’ senses of being part of those

left behind by globalization—for example, by claiming to represent these individuals—and these appeals may prove successful. Both mechanisms might, in the end, lead to distinct party preferences and voting behavior of self-perceived globalization losers and winners.

In this account, self-perceptions as globalization losers and winners are important because subjective group membership might be a glue that connects socio-structural roots and political manifestations of an emerging globalization cleavage and lends structure and stability to it. This account—which is broadly in line with Kriesi and colleagues (2008) and other contributions on the globalization divide—implies self-perceptions as globalization losers or winners to correlate with “objective” socio-structural divisions on the one hand and with globalization-related issue attitudes as well as vote choice on the other. Yet, because such self-perceptions have not been measured, we do not know whether this is the case.

To explore what is the case, and to thereby inform the debate on the globalization divide, we included a question on whether individuals see themselves as “losers” or “winners of globalization” in the Campaign Panel 2017 of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES 2019). This dataset enables us to study to what extent (German) citizens self-categorize as “losers” or “winners of globalization” and to what extent they avoid ascribing to these categories. Moreover, we are able to explore how self-categorizations as globalization winner or loser are associated with other elements of the suggested globalization divide: Its socio-structural roots, issue attitudes, and party choices.

Initially, we found that a relevant share of citizens self-categorizes as either loser (about a fifth) or winner (about a third) of globalization. Still, many chose a neutral response. We then tested a set of expectations regarding the correlates of these self-categorizations. Our approach is straightforward: Where previous studies have classified “globalization losers” and “winners” based on “objective” socio-structural markers and then studied whether these scholarly-defined

groups hold distinct issue attitudes and party preferences, we rely on subjective group membership. We ask: Do those socio-structural categorized as globalization losers and winners by scholars self-categorize in that way? Do self-categorized globalization losers and winners differ in issue attitudes and party preferences in similar ways as has been suggested for scholarly-defined globalization losers and winners? In essence, we ask whether there is evidence of a division between “globalization losers” and “winners” in ways suggested by the globalization cleavage literature *at the level of subjective group membership*.

We find, first, stark differences in party preferences: The predicted probability to intend to vote for the radical-right AfD is 34% among self-categorized losers and 5% among self-categorized winners of globalization. Second, self-categorized globalization losers and winners hold distinctive positions on globalization-related issues such as trade, immigration, and European integration—but do not differ consistently on traditional economic “left-right” issues. Third, investigating socio-structural divisions emphasized in previous research on the globalization divide, we find socio-economic deprivation at the regional level to affect individual’s self-perceptions and we find a large educational gap, especially in more recent cohorts.

Overall, we find evidence of a division between “globalization losers” and “winners” at the level of subjective group membership that is rooted in social structure and politically consequential. Our study thereby joins recent calls to pay more attention to how group awareness and social identity may be relevant for emerging cleavage constellations (Bornschieer et al. 2021; Helbling and Jungkunz 2020). However, our study is only one of the first steps in such a direction. Our limited focus on self-categorizations as globalization losers and winners is concerned only with the “self-awareness” (Conover 1988: 53) or cognitive aspect of group identification and neglects other important dimensions of social identity. In the conclusion, we take up these and other limitations and discuss how this line of research might be extended, both in terms of substantive and geographical scope.

In the next section, we situate our study in research on the globalization divide and discuss how self-categorizations as globalization losers or winners might be relevant to it. We then turn to the empirical analysis, which is structured into an analysis of vote choices, issue attitudes, and socio-structural characteristics of self-categorized losers and winners of globalization. In the conclusion, we discuss implications, limitations, and avenues for future research.

The globalization divide and self-categorized losers and winners of globalization

A growing body of research suggests that contemporary processes of realignment, in Western Europe and beyond, are driven by an underlying political conflict over the multifaceted transformations associated with globalization. Pioneering this literature, Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) suggest that an “integration-demarcation cleavage” has emerged in Western European countries. Starting at the societal level, they argue that processes of economic, political, and societal internationalization affect individuals heterogeneously, thereby giving rise to a structural conflict between the “winners” and “losers” of these developments. Winners would be those who profit from economic transformations and value cultural changes associated with globalization, while the reverse holds for losers:

“The ‘losers’ of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat to their social status and their social security. Their life chances and action spaces are being reduced. The ‘winners’, on the other hand, include people who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 5).

For Kriesi and colleagues, the winner-loser distinction is not only one that researchers make but citizens themselves, and that parties may use for their advantage: “we assume that citizens perceive these differences between ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalization, and that these categories are articulated by political parties” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 4). In a nutshell, the argument is that individuals perceive themselves as either winners or losers of broad economic and


cultural changes associated with globalization.¹ Such perceptions would “have a real basis” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 8) in the sense of being rooted in “objective” socio-structural divisions. Individuals then form policy preferences in line with these self-perceptions—demanding either “integration” or “demarcation”. Parties take up these demands appealing to either (self-perceived) losers or winners via their programs. Based on these appeals, (self-perceived) winner and losers of globalization vote for different parties. In the left-hand panel of Figure 1, we sketch this theoretical argument. This account suggests a key role for self-perceptions as losers or winners of globalization, which mediate between social structure and political preferences.

In their empirical analysis of the supply side of the new cleavage, Kriesi and colleagues (2008, 2012) show that it is primarily parties of the radical right who formulate a “losers’ program”, framing demarcation in cultural and nativist terms and emphasizing opposition to immigration and European integration. In their empirical analysis of the demand side, these authors resort to the socio-structural markers of education and occupational classes to target “those social groups that may perceive the process of denationalization as a chance or as a threat” (Kriesi et al. 2008: 238). They find that those classified as losers of globalization by the researchers—citizens with lower levels of formal education and unskilled workers—tend to oppose immigration and European integration and overproportionately vote for parties of the radical right. While featuring prominently in the theoretical argument, individuals’ self-perceptions as either globalization losers or winners are not part of the empirical analyses in Kriesi et al. (2008,

¹ The construct of (self-perceived) winners and losers of globalization is inspired by earlier work on the idea that “losers of modernization” constitute a voter reservoir for the radical right (e.g., Betz 1994; Kriesi 1999). Like in research on the losers of globalization, we are unfamiliar with academic work on the “losers of modernization” hypothesis containing direct measures of whether individuals self-categorize as “losers of modernization”, societal transformations or the like. Studies in this tradition tend to rely on either “objective” measures of social stratification, like occupational classes, or on measures of subjective socio-economic deprivation. It is instructive to cite Kriesi’s (1999: 407) earlier work on the losers of modernization here: “Empirical evidence to substantiate the hypothesis that the new radical right is above all mobilizing the losers of the modernization process is very difficult to come by. One difficulty is that the category of ‘modernization losers’ is [...] quite a heterogeneous one that does not correspond to any of the categories in questionnaires purported to measure social status.” In the empirical part, we will return to the question of how our operationalization is distinct from items capturing a general sense of socio-economic deprivation.

2012). Rather, the argument tested in these studies with regard to the voter level concerns the links between social structure, issue attitudes, and party choices—as displayed in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.

Figure 1: Self-perception as globalization loser/winner and the globalization divide



Note: Reconstruction of the theoretical argument and the empirical analysis in Kriesi et al. (2008) on the voter-level manifestations of the “integration-demarcation-cleavage”. While the theoretical argument suggests a role of self-perceptions as globalization losers or winners, such self-perceptions are not part of the empirical analysis. Black arrows in the left-hand panel are those of main interest in our empirical analysis below.

Numerous scholars have seconded that there would be a new structural line of political conflict that revolves around issues related to globalization, be it a “globalization divide” (Mader et al. 2020; Teperoglu & Tsatsanis 2011), a “communitarian-cosmopolitan dimension” (Teney et al. 2014), a “cross-cutting divide” along “issues associated with globalization” (Hellwig 2014), a “transnational cleavage” (Hooghe & Marks 2018), a “cosmopolitan-parochial divide” (de Vries 2018), a “transnationalist-nationalist dimension” (Jackson & Jolly 2021) or a cosmopolitan vs.

communitarian “struggle over borders” (de Wilde et al. 2019). These studies, most of them also focusing on Western Europe, document the increasing salience of new issues related to globalization, in particular: immigration and European integration, at the party level. At the citizen level, they show that attitudes on these globalization-related issues align with each other and that they are associated with socio-structural characteristics of individuals—most notably education. Moreover, these attitudes increasingly structure voting behavior, with adverse views on globalization-related issues being a key predictor of voting for the radical right.

While most of these studies also draw on the idea that there would be (self-perceived) “winners” and “losers” of globalization, none of the studies we are aware of has tested whether individuals view themselves in these terms—and whether these self-perceptions are linked to other building blocks of the alleged divide, as suggested by Kriesi et al. (2008). In terms of Figure 1, these studies’ empirical analyses also speak to the model on the right-hand side and do not explore the model on the left-hand side. Our study intends to fill this gap, by exploring the links depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 1 with the black arrows.

The little attention that has been devoted to the twin question whether individuals see themselves as “losers of globalization” (or winners), and to what consequence, is surprising in light of scholars’ frequent references to these constructs. A Google Scholar search returns more than 4,400 hits for “losers of globalization” or alternative spellings.² Scholars, across disciplines, write that individuals “experience” or “see” “themselves as losers of globalization” (e.g., Beck & Sznaider 2010: 643; Pappas 2016: 26; de Wilde et al. 2019: 18), thereby implying self-awareness. Why, then, has previous scholarship not simply asked individuals whether they

²As of May 6th, 2021. For current results, you may follow this link: https://scholar.google.de/scholar?hl=de&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=%22losers+of+globalisation%22+OR+%22losers+of+globalization%22+OR+%22losers+from+globalization%22+OR+%22losers+from+globalisation%22+OR+%22globalization+losers%22+OR+%22globalisation+losers%22&btnG=,

view themselves as losers or winners of globalization?³ Apart from the simple but highly unlikely answer that no one has had the idea, we see two main reasons for this reluctance—related to two potential concerns with our analysis—that we will discuss in turn.

The first reason is the concern that one might not get meaningful answers when bluntly asking individuals whether they see themselves as losers of globalization. This could be for two reasons. For one, based on the tendency of individuals to avoid ascribing to negatively connotated social categories (Huddy 2001; Tajfel & Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981) respondents might be reluctant to see themselves as “losers” (cf. Bornschier et al. 2021) and to self-categorize in that way in a survey. Second, “globalization” is an abstract concept, and we might not expect individuals to have an (elaborate) understanding of the term. Both concerns are justified. Yet, these are ultimately empirical questions we can better address once we have collected data on responses to such items. Relatedly, recent research has found that, when repeatedly surveyed, respondents report stable attitudes towards the concept of “globalization”, that are aligned with orientations towards specific globalization-related issues, and independently affect voting decisions (Mader et al. 2020). Such evidence indicates that respondents hold meaningful attitudes towards globalization. This does not clarify how elaborate respondents’ understandings of the concept ultimately are but suggests that globalization may at least be relevant as a symbol for broad changes in the economic, social, and political domain related to processes of denationalization that triggers a positive or negative response. By extension, respondents may also hold meaningful attitudes towards how they themselves are affected by “globalization”.

³ A partial exception are studies on self-perceived losers of international trade and economic integration. Margalit (2012), for example, studies a question from the Pew Global Attitudes Project on whether “growing trade and business ties between our country and other countries” are good or bad “for you and your family”. In contrast, we are interested in whether individuals think of themselves generically as losers or winners of “globalization” without providing a specific definition of globalization that may bias responses in one direction or the other.

The second reason is the conviction that it is ultimately not truly relevant whether respondents see themselves as losers or winners of globalization. On this, we disagree. On the one hand, the suggestion that many citizens perceive themselves as losers of globalization is a prominent one, part of broader scholarly and public debates, that should be tested empirically to inform these debates. Also, it is doubtful to what extent “losers” and “winners” of globalization can be meaningful scholarly categories if they find no expression in citizens’ self-perceptions. On the other hand, we second the substantial points made above on how such self-perceptions might be relevant. To recall, first, respondents’ attitudes towards globalization-related issues may have more to do with their self-perceptions as either losers or winners of globalization than with their “objective” socio-structural characteristics. Second, political elites may appeal directly to voters’ senses of being losers of globalization.⁴ Third, such self-perceptions might be important mediators between socio-structural roots and political manifestations of an emerging divide over globalization. To better understand this potential relevance, it is necessary to explore empirically whether individuals self-categorize as losers or winners of globalization, and to what effect.

Addressing this twin question speaks to a broader endeavor, namely studying the role of subjective group membership and attachment for emerging cleavage constellations. Classic contributions to the cleavage literature have pointed to the crucial role that group awareness and social identity play for the formation, stability, and durability of political cleavages (Bartolini & Mair 1990; Bartolini 2000; Deegan-Krause 2007; Lipset & Rokkan 1967;

⁴ A well-known example for a related rhetoric can be found in Donald Trump’s 2017 inauguration speech, mimicking what he had said on the campaign trail. While falling short of explicitly speaking of “losers” of globalization, Trump addressed the “struggling families all across our land”, “the forgotten men and women of our country”, a middle class whose wealth “has been ripped from their homes and then redistributed all across the world”. In Trump’s speech, these group appeals are meshed with demarcationist—“America first”—statements. Similar appeals are a cornerstone of Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric who claims to represent “la France de oublié”, the France of the forgotten. Such rhetoric may resonate with individuals who view themselves as “losers” of globalization. It probably won’t find much acceptance among those who think of themselves as winners of globalization.

Przeworski & Sprague 1986). As these classics make clear, historical cleavages have been held together not only by shared issue attitudes within a group, but also by a collective identity. When citizens share and are invested in a common understanding of who they are, political elites may appeal to such identities, claiming to represent this collective. In the end, a full-fledged political cleavage is not least characterized by the existence of socio-structurally rooted social identities that come with certain values and political attitudes as well as party affiliations.

Regarding the proposed new globalization divide, it is unclear whether and how it is rooted in subjective group membership and attachment. This aspect of the “cultural element” (Bartolini & Mair 1990: 215) of the alleged political cleavage has received limited attention so far: “The extent to which group consciousness or collective identity exist around this cleavage [...] has yet to be shown” (Helbling & Jungkunz 2020: 1191). Only recently have empirical studies begun to apply the insights on the political importance of the social identity component to the emerging new political divides (Bornschieer et al. 2021; Helbling & Jungkunz 2020; Hobolt et al. 2021; Stubager 2009; Teney et al. 2014).

Our contribution is most closely related to Bornschieer et al. (2021), who study the role of group attachment for the “universalism-particularism divide”. Studying Switzerland, they show that *feelings of closeness* to a range of social groups—including occupational classes, educational groups, men and women, rural and urban people, and cosmopolitans—are rooted in social structure and are associated with vote choices, particular with the opposition between parties of the left and the far-right Swiss People’s Party (SVP). Our approach is similar to Bornschieer et al. (2021) in that we also study group-related attitudes as mediators between social structure and political preferences from the cleavage perspective. The fundamental difference is that we study *self-categorizations*, in our case as “losers” or “winners” of globalization. Our analyses are complementary as they speak to distinct components of group identification: “psychological sense of attachment to the group” and “self-awareness of one’s membership in the group”

(Johnston 1981: 53). This discussion also drives home an important point, namely that these are only first steps towards a more encompassing consideration of social identity. In our case, we can contribute to the question of whether individuals self-categorize as globalization losers and winners when asked, we cannot say whether this is a category that is salient to their social identity and how attached they feel to other members of this group.

With this limitation in mind—which we will take up discussing in the conclusion—we turn to the empirical analysis. We first discuss our measure of self-categorizations as globalization loser or winner. We then explore the links suggested by the model in the left-hand side of Figure 1. Moving backwards, we start with vote choices, then turn to issue attitudes, and end with socio-structural roots.


Self-categorized losers and winners of globalization in the 2017 German Campaign Panel

Our empirical analysis draws on the 2017 Campaign Panel of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES 2019), which was carried out as an online panel survey in the context of the 2017 German Federal Election. The Campaign Panel consists of nine waves. The question on self-categorization as either globalization loser or winner is part of the last wave, which was in the field in March 2018. 12,021 respondents completed the interview of wave 9.

As part of the interview, respondents were asked “Do you see yourself as a loser or a winner of globalization?” Respondents could choose answers on a numbered scale from 1 to 7, with (only) the endpoints labeled “loser” (1) and “winner” (7), or a “don’t know” option. As previewed above, this is a question about self-categorization that taps into an individual’s perception that he or she belongs to these groups. We display the answers in Figure 1 below. The left-hand panel shows the original answers, in the right-hand panel answers are collapsed with answers

above the midpoint combined to self-categorized winner and answers below the midpoint to self-categorized loser.

Figure 1: Self-categorization as loser or winner of globalization



While there is a substantial share of “don’t know” responses, more than 4 in 5 respondents located themselves on the scale provided. This is an indication that most respondents had an idea of these constructs and could relate to them in one way or the other. At the same time, almost a third of respondents located themselves at the midpoint of the scale—an ambiguous answer which allows for different interpretations. It might indicate the explicit perception of being neither a winner or a loser, or the absence of a strong attitudinal reaction. Overall, half of the respondents provided answers indicating an association with either the losing or winning side. Among those, self-categorized winners outnumber self-categorized losers by a ratio of about 3:2.

We can conclude that a substantial share of respondents self-categorizes either as winner or loser of globalization (when asked to do so in a survey). This is most notable in case of the self-perceived losers, for two related reasons. First, it vindicates scholars’ speculations that a

substantial share of citizens thinks of themselves in these terms, at least when prompted. Second, this is especially remarkable because negatively connotated social categories—and the “loser” label carries this connotation in a most obvious way—tend to be psychologically unattractive. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that self-perceived losers of globalization are a relatively small minority, at least in this German context.

While these descriptive results provide initial evidence that self-categorizations as globalization loser (and winner) exist, it is a different matter whether they are politically consequential. The most direct way to address this is to assess how they relate to vote choices, an exercise to which we turn next.

Vote choices of self-categorized losers and winners of globalization

In this section, we study how self-categorizations as globalization loser vs. winner structure vote choices. Based on previous studies on the globalization divide and related work (e.g., Betz 1994; Bornschier 2010; de Vries 2018; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012; Mader et al. 2020), we expected self-categorized losers of globalization to overproportionately favor the radical right—in the German context: the AfD—and to do so at the expense of the established mainstream parties. In contrast, the latter should be dominant among self-categorized winners of globalization.

Party leaders, for example then-chairman Alexander Gauland (2018), have openly portrayed the AfD as a voice for those losing out from globalization.⁵ In an internal AfD strategy paper for the 2017 federal election campaign, “citizens with below-average income (‘kleine Leute’)

⁵ The AfD would represent their interests in a growing “rupture”, present across “all Western societies”, between a “globalist class” and the “so-called simple people whose jobs are often poorly paid or no longer exists, who have worked hard a lifelong and now have to live from a shabby pension [...] for whom ‘Heimat’ is still a value and who are the first to lose it because it is their milieu that the immigrants stream into” (Gauland 2018; authors’ translation).


in precarious districts [...] who feel as losers of globalization” (AfD 2016: 4; authors’ translation) are listed as one of the party’s key target groups. Clearly, the party attempts to mobilize voters who can relate to such descriptions, also by appealing to their sense of belonging to those who have been on the losing side of the transformations associated with globalization. Such appeals may resonate with voters who perceive themselves as losers of globalization.

In the academic and public debate on the electorate of the AfD, it has been vividly discussed whether its voters are overproportionately (self-perceived) losers of globalization. Yet, the “globalization loser” thesis has also been frequently contested, based on the finding of absent or only weak relations between measures of objective or subjective socio-economic deprivation and the AfD vote (e.g., Lengfeld 2017; Manow 2018). What if we ask individuals for their self-perception as globalization loser or winner?

Figure 2 shows vote intentions for the different (collapsed) categories of self-categorization as globalization loser or winner.⁶ The differences across the groups, especially between self-categorized losers and winners, are striking. This difference is especially large in case of the AfD: Its share is almost 6 times higher among self-perceived globalization losers than among winners. Among self-categorized losers of globalization, the AfD is by far the strongest party, followed by The Left whose support is 1.6 times higher among losers than winners. Of those self-categorized losers with an intention to vote, more than a third opt for the AfD, and 40% of the AfD supporters self-categorize as losers of globalization.

⁶ For our main analysis, we used vote intentions for the party vote (“Zweitstimme”) in federal elections, drawn from the same wave (wave 9) as the globalization loser/winner self-categorization. We rerun our analysis using vote choices in the 2017 federal election, as reported in recall-questions in wave 8, or, if missing, wave 9. The results, shown in the appendix, are similar. For the analyses of vote choices, we weighted observations based on respondents’ recalled vote choices (including non-participation) to match the official results of the 2017 federal election. Other results are from unweighted data yet are similar with (different) post-stratification weights.

Figure 2: Vote intention by self-categorized globalization loser vs. winner



Self-perceived losers are also more likely to intend to vote for one of the other small parties and to report no intention to vote.⁷ The older mainstream parties SPD, FDP, and especially the CDU/CSU as well as the Greens are much stronger among self-categorized globalization winners as compared to losers. Vote shares of those in the neutral middle fall in between the results for the losers and winners. The same is true for the don't know category, with the exception that the share of those with no intention to vote is even higher than among self-perceived losers.

In a next step, we analyzed voting intentions via multinomial logistic regressions.⁸ In Figure 3, we display predicted probabilities from these for the different values of self-categorization as globalization loser vs. winner. Figure 3 contains results from three models: The first model includes only socio-demographic controls, the second model adds a measure of subjective

⁷ The latter is mirrored in lower self-reported participation in the 2017 federal election, with a (post-stratification weighted) abstention rate of 30.8% among self-perceived losers and 8.8% among self-perceived winners.

⁸ In contrast to the descriptive results above, we limited the analysis to those with an intention to vote.

economic deprivation, the third model adds self-categorization in a traditional social class scheme. Details on the control variables are reported in the appendix.

The socio-demographic model mirrors the large differences in vote choices of self-categorized globalization losers vs. winners reported in the bivariate results of Figure 2. These are especially large in case of the AfD: Self-categorized winners of globalization have a predicted probability to vote for the AfD of 5%, among self-categorized losers this probability is 34%. Again, we see a reverse image among the established mainstream parties, with the winner-loser gap being especially large when it comes to CDU/CSU and the Greens.

Are these results driven by the possibility that self-categorizations as globalization loser/winner just reflect a general sense of subjective deprivation? The predicted probabilities from the second model suggest that this is not the case. Differences in vote probabilities remain large, especially in case of the AfD, when we include an item on respondents' assessments of whether they get a "fair share" compared to how other people live in Germany. Moreover, while the two variables covary, there remains independent variance (see the appendix): For example, a quarter of self-categorized globalization winners say that they get less than their fair share.

Figure 3: Vote probabilities by self-categorization as globalization loser vs. winner



+ only socio-dem. controls + plus subj. deprivation + plus subj. social class

Note: Predicted vote probabilities of vote intention based on multinomial logistic regressions, including “other” as a further outcome category (not shown). Demographic controls are education, age group, gender, living in the Eastern part of Germany and income. Subjective deprivation measures whether respondents think they get a fair share compared to other people live in Germany, distinguishing between “a lot/a bit more”, “fair share”, “a bit less” and “a lot less”. Self-categorized social class distinguishes between “lower and working class”, “lower middle class”, “middle class” and “upper (middle) class”. Data weighted by a post-stratification weight including reported voting behavior in the 2017 Bundestag election. 5,449 observations (held constant across models). McFadden R^2 is 0.066 in model 1, 0.080 in model 2 and 0.083 in model 3. 95% confidence intervals displayed.

The results remain also stable when we add a measure of self-categorized social class membership. This suggests that the differences in party preferences we find between self-categorized globalization losers and winners are not driven by subjective class membership being related to vote choices. While it is the case that self-categorized globalization losers are more likely to self-categorize as “lower” or “working class” and that winners are more likely to self-categorize as “middle class” or “middle (upper) class”, this association is also far from perfect (as shown in the appendix). This suggests that individuals think about these social categories differently. Accordingly, these are to be treated as separate constructs. What is more,

self-categorization as globalization loser/winner is a much stronger predictor of voting intentions than self-categorized social class membership.⁹

Overall, we find substantial associations between self-categorization as globalization loser vs. winner and voting intentions, mainly in the form of self-categorized losers' much higher probability to prefer the AfD and their much lower inclination to prefer the CDU/CSU and the Greens. These differences largely persist when we include a measure of subject deprivation and subjective class membership. This tentatively suggests that some of these differences are specific to individuals thinking of themselves as losers (or winners) *of globalization* and do not just reflect a general perception of where they stand in the societal hierarchy, although these perceptions are likely to be very much interwoven and are thus hard to disentangle. Next, we turn to the question of how attitudes towards policy issues differ between globalization's self-categorized winners and losers.

Issue attitudes of self-categorized losers and winners of globalization

In line with the globalization cleavage account depicted on the left-hand side of Figure 1, we expected self-categorized losers and winners of globalization to primarily differ in their attitudes on issues associated with globalization, that is, international trade and market integration, European integration, and immigration. Relying on objective socio-economic markers to classify individuals as losers or winners of globalization, previous studies have shown that those with less formal education, as well as production workers, tend to be more globalization-sceptic across different facets of globalization (e.g., Bovens & Wille 2017; de

⁹ We show plots with predicted probabilities conditioning on subjective class membership, on the one hand, and subjective deprivation, on the other, in the appendix. Bivariate models with each of the three predictors included in isolation returns a Mc-Fadden Pseudo R^2 of 0.038 for self-categorized globalization loser vs. winner, 0.35 for subjective deprivation and 0.016 for subjective class membership.

Vries 2018; de Wilde et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). We add to this literature by studying how attitudes vary among *self-perceived* globalization losers and winners.

The GLES Campaign Panel includes a large set of items on policy issues that allow us to explore how issue attitudes differ between self-categorized losers and winners of globalization. While our focus is on issues related to globalization, we included issue items pertaining to other issue domains for a more complete picture.¹⁰ The analysis we conduct is descriptive. It is difficult, perhaps even a futile enterprise, to disentangle the direction of causality between self-categorization as globalization loser/winner and policy attitudes. We thus report simple means per category, shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4 shows that self-perceived losers of globalization are consistently more hostile towards globalization across its different facets than winners, with the other two groups in between. This is perhaps trivial regarding general attitudes towards “globalization”, yet differences are also substantial—and consistent over the various items—for international trade and market integration, European integration, and immigration.

Differences for other issues are not nearly as consistent. For example, self-categorized losers of globalization are slightly more supportive of state intervention to reduce income differences and higher taxes for the rich, but these winner-loser gaps are smaller than for all globalization-related items. Moreover, self-perceived losers of globalization do not lean more towards higher social welfare benefits at the expense of higher taxes. Thus, they are not consistently more “left-wing” on economic issues. This may come as a surprise because one may think of self-categorized losers as socio-economically disadvantaged (in the next section we show that there is truth to this). Yet, very much in line with their self-categorization as losers of globalization,

¹⁰ To use data adjacent to our measure of self-categorization as globalization winner/loser, we took items from waves 9 and 8 (with two exceptions, for which we had to rely on wave 7 and 4, respectively). We provide details on these measures in the appendix.

what distinguishes them are their attitudes on issues associated with globalization. These results mirrors findings in Mader et al. (2020): Their study shows that attitudes on globalization as such largely go together with attitudes on international market integration, European integration, and immigration—and not with attitudes towards redistribution. In a similar vein, attitudes on these “globalization issues” go together with individuals’ self-categorization as losers or winners of globalization.


Figure 4: Attitudes on policy issues by self-categorization as globalization loser vs. winner



Note: Mean by category of globalization loser vs. winner variable. See appendix for more information on issue variables. All variables have been rescaled to range from zero to one.

A limitation of Figure 4 is that by comparing means only, we can say little about the extent of overlap in the entire distributions of attitudes. To address this, we computed the mean of an individual's answers to the nine globalization-related items (first three rows) and to the three economic left-right items (fourth row) displayed in Figure 4. The left-hand panel of Figure 5 shows a scatterplot based on these two means, with individuals marked by whether they categorized as globalization loser or winner (other categories not shown). The right hand-panel shows corresponding density plots of the two variables. Figure 5 shows that, despite some overlap in the distributions, (only) attitudes on globalization-related issues are to a large degree sorted by individuals' self-categorizations as globalization loser or winner.

Figure 5: Globalization-related and economic left-right issue positions (indices) of self-categorized globalization losers vs. winners



Note: Displayed are mean indices of individuals' answers to globalization-related and economic left-right issues. Only self-categorized winner and losers shown, others are excluded. Jitter added to scatterplot to prevent overlaying.

Socio-structural roots of self-categorization as globalization winner or loser

The results in the two previous sections establish that the self-categorization as globalization loser vs. winner is associated with vote choices and attitudes on globalization-related issues to a substantial degree—in line with the lower part of the left-hand side of Figure 1. Taking up the upper part of the left-hand side of Figure 1, the last question we turn to is whether and how these self-categorizations are anchored in social structure. We focus on two such potential anchors that have attracted much attention in the literature: Education and socio-economic inequalities between regions (cf. Ford & Jennings 2020).

First, in previous work on the globalization divide, scholars have used formal education as the key socio-structural marker to classify which individuals might be counted as winners and which ones as losers of globalization (e.g., de Vries 2018; de Wilde et al. 2019; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012). A plethora of studies, within this body of literature and beyond, reveal a growing rift between those with high and low levels of formal education regarding attitudes on globalization-related issues—immigration, European integration and international trade—as well as voting for the radical right (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Bovens & Wille 2017; de Wilde et al. 2019; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2007; Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Ivarsflaten & Stubager 2013; Kriesi et al. 2008, 2012; Rydgren 2013; Stubager 2009, 2010, 2013). Here, we explore whether a similar educational divide exists regarding individuals' self-categorizations as losers or winners of globalization, in line with the guiding idea that these self-perceptions mediate between social structure and political preferences.

Both economic and value-based mechanism have been brought forward to theorize the effect of education. First, structural economic changes—some of them driven by globalization, including rising international trade in goods and services and the addition of overproportionately low-skilled immigrants to labor supply—have increased the premium of

formal education in the labor markets of high-income democracies. Those with low levels of formal education are relative economic losers of such transformations. Second, high formal education is associated with valuing cultural diversity and a cosmopolitan outlook. Accordingly, the higher educated should tend to perceive cultural changes associated with globalization as a gain rather than a loss. In line with untested assumptions of previous studies, we thus expected those with lower levels of education to be more likely to self-categorize as losers of globalization, and those with higher levels of education individuals to be more likely to self-categorize as winners of globalization. We also tested the idea that education might *increasingly* matter for self-categorization as globalization loser/winner in more recent cohorts. We reasoned that if globalization introduced a rift between educational groups that opened up only over time, the perceived winner-loser gap might be larger within younger cohorts.¹¹

Second, we followed up on recent studies—conducted within the broader context of the globalization divide—on the attitudinal and electoral consequences of socio-economic disparities between regions. These studies show how socio-economic deprivation at the local level, driven by globalization-induced and other types of structural economic change, may fuel globalization-sceptic attitudes and right-wing populist party success (Adler & Ansell, 2020; Broz et al., 2021; Carreras et al., 2019; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; Steiner & Harms 2020). Evidence suggests that these types of reactions are to some extent sociotropic, taking place even among those individuals not personally affected by socio-economic disadvantage. Divergences between booming regions and those falling behind thus seem to be another

¹¹ Relatedly, shifts associated with the “educational revolution” and the advent of a “knowledge society” seem to have diminished perceptions of social status among those with less formal education (Gidron & Hall 2020; Spruyt et al. 2016). For one, labor market experiences of younger cohorts have been increasingly affected by the growing premium of education mentioned above. Second, while a vast majority of the immediate post-World War II cohorts left school without completing upper-secondary schooling, these patterns have shifted dramatically (Bovens & Wille 2017). Low-educated younger individuals, being in the minority within their cohort, may thus be particularly likely to feel as losers of globalization. In contrast, highly educated younger people, perceiving themselves both as economic winners and embracing the cultural shifts associated with globalization, should be most likely to self-categorize as winners of globalization.

important socio-structural divide underlying the globalization divide. In line with the model on the left-hand side of Figure 1, this divide is likely to operate in part through individuals' self-perceptions as losers or winners of globalization.

To explore the role of these and other socio-structural correlates of self-categorization as globalization loser or winner, we present results from ordered logistic regression models. The dependent variable distinguishes between self-categorization as loser of globalization, the middle category and self-categorization as winner of globalization. "Don't know" responses are treated as missing values.¹² Below, we focus on predicted probabilities of self-categorizing as loser of globalization, which are mirrored in opposite patterns we observe for self-categorization as winner of globalization.

As individual-level predictors, we distinguish between three levels of formal education and four birth cohorts, interaction between these two variables, net household income, gender, unemployment, and living in the Eastern part of Germany (see appendix for details). We also included an additional interaction between birth cohorts and living in the East, as former inhabitants of the GDR may be more likely to self-categorize as losers of globalization (Mau 2019). To incorporate the socio-economic situation at the regional level, we merged—via an electoral district identifier included in the GLES Campaign Panel—a dataset from the Federal Returning Officer (Bundeswahlleiter 2021) containing socio-economic information on electoral districts. From these data, we constructed an index of socio-economic conditions based on the first component from a principal component analysis (see the appendix) of disposable income per capita, gross domestic product per capita, unemployment rate, birth balance (crude birth

¹² Results from multinomial logistic regressions with "don't know" included as a separate category are shown in the appendix. These results lend justification to our ordinal treatment of the three categories in our main models: Marginal effects on self-categorization as loser and as winner are mirror images of each other, and marginal effects on the probability of choosing the middle category fall in between these effects. Regarding the "don't know" category, we find that being male and having a high degree of education decrease the probability of a "don't know" response, but little of substantial significance beyond that.

rate minus mortality rate), and number of employees subject to social insurance. In models with the regional socio-economic index included we estimated random-intercept multilevel models with individuals nested in electoral districts.

Figure 6 shows results from an ordered logit model on the individual-level socio-structural correlates of self-categorization as globalization loser vs. winner. The left-hand side indicates how the probability to self-categorize as loser of globalization changes with these covariates on average over the observed data. Self-categorization as globalization loser becomes more likely with lower income, being unemployed, less formal education and living in the Eastern part of Germany. The youngest cohort is, on average, least likely to self-categorize as loser of globalization and those aged 50 to 64 are most likely to do so.¹³


The right hand-side of Figure 6 visualizes the interactions between education and cohorts, on the one hand, and between East/West Germany and cohorts, on the other. The upper part shows that within the oldest cohort probabilities to self-categorize as loser of globalization hardly differ between educational groups. Among younger cohorts, we observe a widening gap between those with high levels and those with low as well as medium levels of education. Within the youngest cohort, the probability to self-categorize as globalization loser is about three times as high among those with low (26%) and medium (22%) levels of education as among the highly educated (8%).¹⁴ Conversely, the probability to self-categorize as globalization winner is about twice as high among highly educated young individuals (66%) than among young people with low (33%) and medium (37%) levels of education (see

¹³ The overall tendency of younger individuals to be less likely to self-categorize as losers of globalization is further amplified by compositional differences in terms of education: In the youngest age group, 58% (of post-stratification weighted) individuals are in the highest educational group and only 10% in the lowest educational group. In the oldest cohort, 32% have a low level of formal education and 36% a high level.

¹⁴ The increasing educational gaps is not an artefact of atypical relations between education and income within the youngest cohort. It remains when not conditioning on income and unemployment. However, the educational gap becomes, unsurprisingly, larger within all cohorts when not adjusting for income and unemployment (see appendix).

appendix). On top of this educational divide, the lower part of Figure 6 shows a significant gap between individuals living in Western and Eastern Germany (only) within older cohorts.¹⁵ Overall, these results confirm the expectation of pronounced educational differences in self-categorizations as globalization loser or winner, especially within more recent cohorts.

Figure 6: Social structure and self-categorization as loser of globalization




Note: Estimated average marginal effects and predicted probabilities from an ordinal logistic regression with 95% confidence intervals. McKelvey-Zavoina- $R^2=0.130$; $N=9,530$.

In Figure 7, we present results on the index of socio-economic conditions at the electoral district level from multilevel ordinal logistic regressions. The graphs show predicted probabilities for self-categorization as loser of globalization over the observed range of values of the socio-economic index. The probabilities on the left-hand side are from a multilevel model with only

¹⁵ The results are virtually identical when using a dummy indicating whether someone was born in an Eastern state instead (see appendix). About 94% of individuals are classified in the same way no matter which operationalization we use.

this index and fixed effects for the federal states.¹⁶ They show how the probability to self-categorize as globalization winner varies across districts without taking compositional differences in individual-level characteristics at the district level into account. The probabilities on the right-hand side are from a multilevel model with the individual-level predictors from above included in addition. They reveal whether, and to what extent, the local level socio-economic situation matters over and above compositional effects of the individual-level variables.

Figure 7: Regional socio-economic situation and self-categorization as loser of globalization



Note: Predicted probabilities from multilevel ordinal logistic regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Index of socio-economic conditions is the first component from a principal component analysis of disposable income per capita (log), gross domestic product per capita (log), unemployment rate, birth balance (crude birth rate minus mortality rate), and number of employees subject to social insurance (per 1,000 inhabitants).

¹⁶ Districts from the city states Berlin and Hamburg are excluded because data are available only at the city level.

Both graphs suggest that the local socio-economy matters for individuals' probability to self-categorize as globalization loser. In the left-hand panel, we observe a pronounced difference of 12 percentage points in the probability to self-categorize as loser of globalization between the low- and the high-end of our composite measure of socio-economic conditions.¹⁷ In the right-hand panel, this difference is roughly half as large (i.e., 5 percentage points), suggesting that much of the differences across regions revealed by the first model can be accounted for by compositional effects. The remaining association, significant at the 0.05-level, suggests that the regional socio-economic situation modestly affects individuals' self-categorization on top of their individual characteristics. Overall, one might conclude that self-perceptions as globalization loser are to some extent rooted in socio-economic deprivation at the local level.

Discussion

This paper departed from the observation that despite scholars' frequent references to the "losers of globalization" little empirical evidence exists on whether this construct holds any meaning at the citizen level. Previous work on a new cleavage around issues associated with globalization suggests that citizens' self-perceptions as either globalization losers or winners are important for this divide, in that such self-perceptions mediate between social structure and political preferences. In this contribution, we have taken up this suggestion, exploring German citizens' self-categorizations as globalization winners/losers and their correlates. We found a sizable group of individuals—roughly a fifth of German citizens—to self-categorize as losers of globalization. Self-categorizations as globalization loser or winner are rooted in social

¹⁷ The index scores highest (=5.75) for "München-Land", covering the suburban parts to the West of Munich and constantly won by CSU candidates since 1953. The highest level of socio-economic deprivation is recorded for "Görlitz" (=−3.06), Germany's most Eastern (electoral) district, located in Saxony and bordering on Poland and the Czech Republic, in which Tino Chrupalla, currently AfD chairman, defeated Michael Kretschmer, CDU, currently Prime Minister of the state of Saxony, in the personal vote tier in the 2017 federal election.

structure in ways suggested by previous work: There is a large educational divide, especially in more recent cohorts, and individuals from socio-economically deprived districts are more likely to self-categorize as globalization losers. These self-perceptions seem, in turn, politically meaningfully: Self-perceived losers and winners hold distinctive positions on issues related to globalization and internationalization and they strongly differ in their party preferences. In the German context we studied, subjective losers of globalization overproportionately support the radical-right AfD: over a third of them supports the party, making up two-fifths of the parties' electorate.

Overall, we conclude that there is evidence of a division between “globalization losers” and “winners” at the level of subjective group membership that is rooted in social structure and politically consequential—thereby largely confirming what others have implied but not tested. In the paper, we have suggested that the subjective division between self-perceived winner and losers of globalization may lend structure and stability to an emerging cleavage over globalization. In this account, self-perceptions as globalization losers and winners might be a glue that connects socio-structural roots and political manifestations of an emerging globalization cleavage and lends structure and stability to it. While our evidence is in line with this account, it is suggestive and correlational only, and needs to be extended in future research both in terms of empirical evidence and theoretical refinement.

One limitation of our study is that we analyze data from of a single country. While one answer to this is the call for similar studies in other countries in future research, we point out that conditions in Germany are not especially conducive for a strong political divide between self-categorized losers and winners of globalization (cf. Bornschier et al. 2021: 28): Germany's electorally successful radical-right party (the AfD) emerged rather recently, whereas many other countries, such as Austria and France, have had strong electoral contenders from the radical right for decades now. We therefore believe that the general patterns we found may well

extend to other countries. In any event, we hope to encourage future survey-based studies in other country contexts, or even comparative studies, on whether individuals perceive themselves as losers or winners of globalization, and to what effect. Several important questions may be addressed along the way: Are there more or less self-categorized losers of globalization in other high-income democracies? Are the socio-structural dividing lines behind these self-categorizations the same in other countries, or are they context-dependent? Are there countries in which parties of the left, rather than the radical right, are best able to mobilize self-categorized losers of globalization, who—at least in the German case—tend to be socio-economically disadvantaged?

The paper also calls for a more serious theoretical and empirical engagement with the role of the identity dimension in cleavage theory, of which we have only scratched the surface. Our contribution is part of broader scholarly attempts to investigate how social identity matters for new political dividing lines (Bornschieer et al. 2021; Helbling & Jungkunz 2020; Hobolt et al. 2021; Stubager 2009; Teney et al. 2014). Our focus on self-categorization as globalization loser/winner is distinct and yields novel empirical evidence, which we hope will inform the further debate. Yet, we cannot say whether these categories are salient to individuals' social identities and how attached they feel to other members of these groups. In short, we do not study social identities comprehensively. This points to empirical limitations future survey-based studies might address. It also points to unresolved theoretical questions on whether and how these categories could function as politically relevant, full-blown social identities.

A first important issue in this context is the question of identity formation and activation. From the communicative perspective, creating a common label or category may be a good idea. To create a social category and to endow it with meaning allows—or is perhaps a prerequisite for—an efficient communication between elite and mass levels. Having a common designation, a label, allows speaking to different segments of society at once. Once established, the social

category may function as a communication device that allows individuals to recognize and address others as being, in some sense, the same, and as belonging together. At the individual level, once self-categorization takes place, the powerful processes of group psychology set in, which may result in the self-categorization turning into an identity. However, “globalization loser”—as noted above—is a negatively valenced category. From the perspective of social identity theory, “the development of group identity is less certain among members of low-status groups who need to additionally develop an identity around alternative, positively valued group attributes (social creativity) or fight to change the group's negative image (social change) before membership can enhance their status (Tajfel & Turner, 1979)” (Huddy 2001: 135). At the communicative level, “globalization loser” therefore does not seem to be an ideal category for political entrepreneurs to base a political movement on and to gather followers around because people might be reluctant to identify with the label. Perhaps, this might work in conjunction with a populist framing that causally attributes the groups relatively deprived status outside of the group (cf. Conover 1988: 62). In light of such doubts, it might seem astonishing that we do observe a significant share of citizens to self-categorize as globalization losers in the first place. In any case, important questions remain how such self-categorizations could be part of social identities and how exactly political entrepreneurs may use such negatively valenced social categorizations to their advantage.

While important questions remain, we believe that this study of self-categorizations as globalization losers or winners informs important scholarly debates. Specifically, we suggest that our findings might reconcile two different bodies of literature on emerging cleavage constellations in Western Europe (cf. Ford & Jennings 2020). Part of this literature, associated with the work of Kriesi and colleagues (2006, 2008, 2012), has paid great attention to how new divisive issues, related to globalization, structure party competition and vote choice. Others have focused on emerging socio-structural dividing lines, most notably education. Where the

former see an “integration-demarcation cleavage” (Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008, 2012), the latter see an “education cleavage” (Stubager 2009, 2010, 2013). We connect these perspectives by showing how self-categorization as globalization loser or winner is increasingly rooted in educational divides *and* consequential for globalization-related issue attitudes and vote choices. Likewise, our findings connect recent studies on the electoral and attitudinal effects of socio-economic disparities across regions (Adler & Ansell, 2020; Broz et al., 2021; Carreras et al., 2019; Colantone & Stanig, 2018a, 2018b; Steiner & Harms 2020) with the globalization cleavage literature. For example, our findings imply that individuals in socio-economically deprived areas are more likely to vote for the radical right, because and to the extent that they view themselves as losers of globalization.

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Appendix to
Subjective Losers of Globalization

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Table A1: Information on control variables

Variable	Wording and Original Coding	Recode
Age	Please enter the year in which you were born. (wave x)	Age=2018-birth year
Eastern Germany	Current residence in state (wave x)	(0) west: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bayern, Saarland (1) east: Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thuringen
Born in Eastern Germany	Born in federal state (wave x)	(0) not born in the east: Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Niedersachsen, Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bayern, Saarland, not born in the territory of the present-day Federal Republic of Germany (1) born in the east: Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thuringen
Education	What is your highest school degree? (1) school completed without degree – (2) Hauptschulabschluss – (3) Realschulabschluss – (4) Fachhochschulreife – (5) Abitur – (9) still in school (wave 9)	(1) (2) → „low“ (3) → „medium“ (4) (5) → „high“
Gender	Please enter you gender. (1) male – (2) female (wave x)	(0) male (1) female
Income	What is your monthly net income of your household? We are interested in the sum after the deduction of taxes and social security contributions. (1) under 500 Euro – (2) 500 to 750 Euro – (3) 750 to 1000 Euro – (4) 1000 to 1250 Euro – (5) 1250 to – (6) 1500 to 2000 Euro – (7) 2000 to 2500 Euro – (8) 2500 to 3000 Euro – (9) 3000 to 4000 Euro – (10) 4000 to 5000 Euro – (11) 5000 to 7500 Euro – (12) 7500 to 10000 Euro – (13) 10000 Euro and more (wave 1 or, if missing, wave a1 for refreshment sample)	(1) (2) (3) → <1000€ (4) (5) (6) → 1000-2000€ (7) (8) → 2000-3000€ (9) → 3000-4000€ (10) (11) (12) (13) → >4000€
Unemployed	Let's move on to your gainful employment and profession. Which of the categories from this list applies to you? (1) in full-time employment (2) in part-time employment (3) in a traineeship or apprenticeship (4) high school student (5) college student (6) retraining course (7) unemployed (8) short-time work	(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) -> not unemployed (7) -> unemployed

	(9) alternative community service (10) in early retirement, retirement, on a pension (11) maternal/parental leave (12) no employment (housewife/househusband) (wave 1 or, if missing, wave a1 for refreshment sample)	
Subjective deprivation	In comparison to how other people live here in Germany, do you think that you get a fair share or not? (1) a lot more than the fair share (2) a bit more than the fair share (3) the fair share (4) a bit less than the fair share (5) a lot less than the fair share (wave 9)	(1) (2) → “a lot/a bit more than the fair share” (3) → “the fair share” (4) → “a bit less than the fair share” (5) → “a lot less than the fair share”
Subjective social class	People talk a lot about social classes these days. Which of these classes do you consider yourself a part of? (1) lower class (2) working class (3) lower middle class (4) middle class (5) upper middle class (6) upper class (wave 1 or, if missing, wave a1 for refreshment sample)	(1) (2) → “lower and working class” (3) → “lower middle class” (4) → “middle class” (5) (6) → “upper (middle) class”

Table A2: Information on issue attitudes

Variable	Wave	Wording	Scale
Globalization is good, reversed	9	All things considered, globalisation is a good thing. (reversed)	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Against global market integration	9	The global integration of markets should be pushed forward further. (reversed)	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Restrict imports	9	Germany should restrict the import of goods from other countries.	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Against investment of foreign companies	9	Foreign companies should be allowed to invest in Germany. (reversed)	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
European unification gone too far	8	Should the European unification be pushed further in order to establish a joint government soon or has the European unification already gone too far? What is your personal view on European unification?	1: European unification should be pushed further ... 7: European unification has already gone too far
Upper limit on refugees	9	Germany needs an annual upper limit ("Obergrenze") for refugees.	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Deport economic refugees	8	Refugees who come to Germany for economic reasons should be deported.	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Immigration should be restricted	8	Let's turn to the issue of immigration. Should it be easier or more difficult for foreigners to immigrate? What is your personal view on immigration of foreigners?	1: immigration for foreigners should be easier ... 7: immigration for foreigners should be more difficult
Foreigner should assimilate	8	There are different views on how much foreigners should assimilate in Germany. Some people think that foreigners should completely assimilate to the German culture. Others think that foreigners should be able to live according to their own culture. What is your personal view on this issue? (reversed)	1: foreigners should completely assimilate to the German culture ... 7: foreigners should be able to live according to their own culture

Rich should pay higher taxes	8	Rich citizens should pay more taxes in the future than they do now.	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Higher welfare benefits & taxes	8	Some people prefer lower taxes, although this results in less social services. Others prefer more social services, although this results in raising taxes. What is your personal view on this issue?	1: lower taxes, although this results in less social services ... 7: more social services, although this results in raising taxes
Reduce differences in income levels	7	The state should take measures to reduce differences in income levels.	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Growth over climate protection	8	Some say that the fight against climate change should definitely take precedence, even if it impairs economic growth. Others say that the economic growth should definitely take precedence, even if it impairs the fight against climate change. What is your personal view on this issue?	1: fight against climate change should take precedence, even if it impairs economic growth ... 7: economic growth should take precedence, even if it impairs the fight against climate change
Petrol & diesel not abolished	8	From 2030 onwards, no new cars with petrol or diesel engines should be registered in Germany. (reversed)	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Combat terrorism vs. privacy	8	Some people think that the state should interfere without restrictions with the privacy and freedom of movement of citizens in order to combat terrorism. Others think that the privacy and freedom of movement of citizens should always be protected even if it hampers the fight against terrorism. What is your personal view on state interference in order to combat terrorism? (reversed)	1: in favour of strong state interference ... 7: against strong state interference
More state powers to fight crime	9	State powers in the fight against crime should be extended, even though this will lead to increased surveillance of citizens.	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree
Homosexuals not adopt children	4	Homosexual civil partnerships should also have the right to adopt children as well. (reversed)	1: strongly disagree ... 5: strongly agree

Figure A1: Self-categorization as globalization lower vs. winner and subjective deprivation





Figure A2: Self-categorization as globalization lower vs. winner and subjective class membership



Figure A3: Predicted vote probabilities by subjective deprivation (“fair share”)



Note: Predicted vote probabilities of vote intention based on multinomial logistic regressions, including “other” as a further outcome category (not shown). 95% confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A4: Predicted vote probabilities by subjective social class



Note: Predicted vote probabilities of vote intention based on multinomial logistic regressions, including “other” as a further outcome category (not shown). 95% confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A5: Recalled vote choice in 2017 federal election by self-perceived globalization loser vs. winner




Figure A6: Predicted vote probabilities (recalled vote choice in 2017 federal election) by self-categorized globalization loser vs. winner



+ only socio-dem. controls + plus subj. deprivation + plus subj. social class


Note: Predicted vote probabilities of recalled vote choices in 2017 federal election based on multinomial logistic regressions, including “other” as a further outcome category (not shown). Demographic controls are education, age group, gender, living in the Eastern part of Germany and income. Subjective deprivation measures whether respondents think they get a fair share compared to other people live in Germany, distinguishing between “a lot/a bit more”, “fair share”, “a bit less” and “a lot less”. Self-categorized social class distinguishes between “lower and working class”, “lower middle class”, “middle class” and “upper (middle) class”. Data weighted by a post-stratification weight including reported voting behavior in the 2017 Bundestag election. 6,079 observations (held constant across models). 95% confidence intervals displayed.

Table A3: Principal component analysis of socio-economic conditions at the district level

Variable	Loading on component 1
disposable income per capita (log)	0.40
gross domestic product per capita (log)	0.55
unemployment rate	-0.27
birth balance	0.49
number of employees subject to social insurance	0.48


Note: 1st component has an Eigenvalue of 2.79 and accounts for 55.9 % of the variance in the variables.

Figure A7: Social structure and self-categorization as globalization winner




Note: Average marginal effects and predicted values based on same model as in Figure 6, yet with winner as an outcome category.

Figure A8: Results from multinomial logit for self-categorization as globalization loser/winner




Note: Average marginal effects based on multinomial logistic regression. 95% confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A9: Predicted values of self-perception as globalization winner by age group and education from reduced model



Note: Predicted values based on model similar to Figure 6 without income and unemployment included. 95% confidence intervals displayed.

Figure A10: Predicted values of self-perception as globalization winner by age group and (a) education and (b) born in East Germany



Note: Predicted values based on regression similar to Figure 6 but with born in East Germany rather than current residence in East vs. West. 95% confidence intervals displayed.